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INTRODUCTION
.
In Illinois, as in the other States of the Union, there
has been a particular development of the law in regard to
the appropriating of property for public uses. This is due
to a difference in /vmterpretation of the common law in
regard to the exercise of the right of eminent domain and
the constitutional provisions and tre great amount of
supplementary legislation on the subject. It is the purpose
of this paper to discuss che development of the right of
eminent domain, the nature of a public use, and the different
uses for which property may be appropriated. The question
of damages and proceedings, which are of more interest to the
lawyer than a student of political science, will be left
practically untouched.

Chapter 1.
EMINENT DOMAIN
Eminent domain occupies such a complicated field in our common
law that before we attempt to define this term it is best to first
consider State control of property in general, and then advance
towards the particular phase of eminent domain.
The rights which a State has over property may be divided into
two classes; the right over public property, and the right over
private property. Over public property the State has the right of
proprietorship and can pass such acts as are deemed necessary for
the attainment of the public good. Public buildings, highways,
navigable rivers, and property held by the State in a private ca-
pacity, as public lands, are examples falling under this class.
The rights and powers which a State has over private property
are more complicated. In Lewis on Eminent Domain these powers are
divided into six classes/
First. The State may regulate the making of contracts between
citizens in respect to property and make enactme-iLS for the acquis-
ition and disposition of property as the public welfare requires.
Examples of such regulation are to be found in the Statute of Frauds
and the Statute of Wills.
Second. The State may take the property of one person and give
it to another in order to enforce some legal obligation which the
first person owes to the second. Laws of attachment and forced
sales of property nre examples of this class.
Third. The State may take the property of an individual as a
/Chapter 1.

fine for the violation of the law.
Fourth. The State may regulate tie use of property in the
interests of the public health, safety and convenience. Familiar
examples of this is to be found in the regulation of public amuse-
ments, in building regulations in regard to safety, and in the
control of noxious trades. This power is commonly called the Right
of Iblice Regulation.
Fifth. The State may exact of the individual a contribution
of a portion of :is property based upon some principle of apportion-
ment, or the possession of some privelege, in order to provide a
fund for meeting the expenses of carrying on the government. This
power is called Taxation.
Sixth. The State may appropriate the property of a person for
the purpose of making it subservient to the^ common good. In this
manner private property is taken by the State or by some corporation
or private person authorise 3 by the State for public uses such as
railways, turnpikes, parks, or for such uses which are more of a
private nature as mills end private ways. Such acts as are included
under this division are spoken of as being under the right of
Eminent Domain.
EMINENT DOMAIN . The courts have been divided as to the nature
of the power of eminent domain ever since the term was coined by
Hugo Grotius. Grotius says 7, " Facultas is twofold, namely, vulgaris ,
which exists for private use, and emi nens which is superior to the
jus vulgar i s since it belongs to the community". Again he says,2"
"The property of subjects is under the power o" eminent domain of
/De Jure^-v?% Pacis, lib. 1, cap. 1.
21dem lib. iii,cap. xx.

3of the State; so that the State, or he who acts for it, may use and
even alienate and destroy such property for ends of public
utility, to which ends those who founded civil society may be sup-
posed to have intended that private ends should give way." Vattel
also gives expression to the same view:
/MThe right which belongs
to the society, or to the sovereign, of disposing, in case of ne-
cessity and for the public safety, of ill che wealth contained in
the State, is called the eminent domain . It is evident that this
right is, in certain cases, necessary to him who governs; and
consequently is a part of empire, or sovereign, power." Indeed
this is the general view of the jurists down to our own days; but
madern writers would not limit the exercise of the power to the
demands of "public safety", contending that the public welfare,
necessity or convenience 're squally proper grounds upon whic£ to
base the exercise of the power.
In the Encyclopedia of the Laws of figland it is said: "The
right of the State or the sovereign to its or his own property
is absolute, while that of the subject or citizen to his property
is only paramount. The citizen holds his property -ubjecx always
to the right of the sovereign to take it for a public purpose. This
right is called 'eminent domain' ".
From the last definition one would would be inclined to con-
clude that the principle underlying the right is of feudal origin,
viz., that the sovereign as the sole allodial owner in the realm
could very properly exercise such a right over his feudatories.
/•Droit des Gens, lib. i, cap.- xx.
2.Vol. iv, p. 486.

The older jurist? as a '//hole were very particular to deny this
theory, possibly actuated by the fear of giving a fillip
to autocracy
in Europe if they were to avow the truth of the matter.
owever
this may be, we find .hat the rigjht is declared to be one
exercisable
by the sovereign power in the interests of the State; and
instead
of being regarded as one of the personal prerogatives of the
State,
it is rather upon the basis of trustee for the public that
the
sovereign is said to be clothed with the right of eminent domain.
The right simply exists as a necessity.
This opinion seems to be the better founded for the doctrine
of eminent domain applies to personal property as well as real
property, and, in fact, such a reserved right has never been men-
tioned in any land -rant or deed. The majority of our S:ates in
the United States follow this opinion
7
', but some 2 still hold to the
reserved right theory.
Cooley in hi
s
l Constituti onal Limitations
Bl defines eminent domain
as "the rightful authority which exists in every sovereignty, to
control and regulate .hose rights of a public nature which pertain
to its citizens in common and to appropriate and control individual
property for the public benefit, as the public safety, necessity,
convenience, and welfare may demand". Mills on Eminent Domain^
defines this power as "The power of the sovereign to condemn prop-
erty for public use". This definition has been criticised as being
too narrow K Such defi dtions seem to be influenced by the fact
that most of the State constitutions limit this power to "public
/Moran v. Ross (79 Calif. 159)
I
Hayward v. Mayor etc. N.y\ (7 N.Y. 314)
Noll v. Dubuque R.R. Co. (32 la. 56.)
Scholl v. German Coal CO. (118 111. /!27)
2 Todd v. Austin (34 Conn. 78), Harding v. Goodie tt (3 Yerg.47)
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use .
The Illinois Rule is well stated in Cerman v. Scholl Co.*' In
that case the court said, "The right to take private property for
public use is generally conceded to be an attribute of sovereignty;
and being such it is not within the power of the State, by legisla-
tion, grant, or otherwise, to surrender or arter it -way. 3ei:.g
inherent, it exists independently of written constitutions or statu-
tory laws, yet, in free governments like our own, where private rights
are secured by wholesome laws and constitutional restrictions, Lhe
power to take private property for common welfare remains dormant
until the terms and conditions upon which it is to be exercised
have been prescribed by legislation. The power or right in question
is by some referred to the feudal theory of tenure by others
to the implied compact theory; but the better opinion , perhaps,
is that it is founded upon public utility and necessity."
*P. 642.
^Section 1.
y.-Lewis Eminent Domain Section 2.
£118 111. 42?

Chapter i i
.
THE TAKING FOR PUBLIC USE
What Is Public Use . Hugo Grotius who was among the first 10
formulate the principles of eminent domain says ,* "This also is to be
noted that a right, even when it has been acquired by subjects, may
j be taken away by the king by force of eminent domain but
to do this by the force of eminent domain , there is required in the
first place, public utility".
Several States including our own restrict the exercise of the
right of eminent domain to the taking for "public use". Judge Cooley
in discussing the meaning of this term says; We find ourselves at
sea when we undertake to define in the light of judicial decisions
what constitutes a public use". Judges have preferred to decide
individual cases according to the settled practice and have avoided
giving any clear cut definition. In general public use is conceded
to be public usefulness, utility, or advantage or what is productive
of general benefit; and any appropriating of private property by the
State under the right of eminent domain for purposes of great ad-
vantage to the community is a taking for public use.
The view taken by the courts of Illinois is expressed in the
case of Scholl v. German Coal Co/ where the court said, "The express-
ion 'public use' ex vi termini, implies an interest or right of some
kind in the public and as the public can have no existence separate
and apart from the people, of which it consists, it follows, that
this interest or right, whatever it is, belongs to and is vested in
ADe Jure Bell^Pacis ii, 14, 7.
£Cooley's Constitutional Limitations p. 532.
£118 111 427.

7ihe people . If the use is a continuing one, as it is in all
case? where property is taken for the purpose of a public ferry,
railway, or' the like, the right or interest of the public is co-
extensive with the use to which it is annexed, and not within the
power of those exercising the right to deprive the people of the
benefits resulting therefrom".
The Use May Be Limite d Or Local . It is not necessary that the
benefit be general and be enjoyed by all. It may be local and lim-
ited. In fact every public use is, to some extent, local and the
benefits to one part of the country more than to others. This is
true of railroads, canals, and all public works.
Not Affecte d _Pv_ Agency EH^^PZ®^* In order t0 exercise ihe right
of eminent domain for public use it is not necessary that the public
own or operate/ The right to exercise this power is derived from
the State, but the right may be delegated. The true test for the
exercise is the object to be accomplished and not the instrument
employed. ^
The Magnitude Of Interest Involved. The magnitude of interest
involved seems to have been a deciding feature in the decisions of
some of the States. In Pennsylvania the legislature may constitu-
tionally authorize a railway company to canstruct a lateral road to
a private mine. The mining industry of that State is of so great
importance that the construction of such a branch road was held to
be increasing the facilities for developing the r tate and for the
general welfa.re ^. In Illinois in a similar case which arose •hen
/Harvey v. Aurora a*id Geneva Ry . Co. 186 111. 295.
^.Ara. and Eng. Ency . of Law, p. 1065
3 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas . 186
tf, Scholl v. German Coal Co. 118 111. 427.
l
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the mining industry was not developed to a <-reat extent .he opposite
view was laken by the Supreme Court. If this case had been delayed i
few years a different decision might have been reached for the doc-
trine seems to be following a particular development best suited to
the needs of the people.
Use May Be Both Public And Private . The public must be to some
extent entitled to enjoy or use the property, not as a mere favor
or by permission of the owner, but by right. In some cases this
use may be both public and private, but in such cases it is essen-
tial chat the private use be incidental to the public use and not
inseparable from it, as in a case where a strip of land was con-
demned for a switch or side track of a railway corporation, it is
no valid objection to show that t e switch runs to a village water
works and may e used for private use. In that case the court said,
"It is insisted that this is a mere private use, and that the track
was built uo serve this use, and because the company was obliged to
by
build ...he requirement of the ordinance. Tills certainly shows that
the track does serve Pis private use, and that it was designed
to do so . But, if in addition to serving such use, the track
be one which is necessary for the convenient operation of the main
line of the railroad, then it may properly come within the purview
of a side track. A side track can surely be none the less such,
because, in addition to the purpose f the side track proper, it
subserves some other private individual use."
£C. & E. I. R.R. CO. v. Wiltse 116 111. 449
^Chicago etc. v. Carri^y 115 in. 155.
* Millet v. People 117 111. 294.
/.South Chicago R.R. Co. v. Dix 109 111. 837*
j,'Scholl v. German Coal Co. 118 111.427*.
1

Use Declared Public By The Lej?islai« i on:. In providing for the
condemnation of private property, the legislature, evidently,
must de^irmine, in the first instance, whether or not the use
for which the property is taken is public. In the ^ase of Lake
Shore etc. R.R. Co. v. Chicago etc. R.R. Cot the court said,
"The power to take private property for public use is one of the
recognized rights of sovereignty and is one of the attributes
inherent in the State. The power to declare under what circum-
stances that righ. may be exercised, and to provide the mode of
its exercise was conferred upon the eneral Assembly by ohat clause
of the constitution which vested in that body 'the legislative
powers of the State' '.'
While the action of the Legislature does not detirmine whether
a use is public it will pain --espect from the counts, especially
in a case where there is some reasonable foundation for the taking,
and in a case where property is taken by the State the courts are
more likely to declare the use to be public .han where che prop-
erty is taken by a private corporation.
Courts Will Hot Inqu ire Into The Expediency Of The Legis-
lation And The Motives Of The Legislators. The legislature is
made the exclusive judge of the necessity or emergency justify-
ing the exercise of the power, and the courts will never question
the motives of the legislators.
The Question of Public Use A Judic ial One. The exercise of
the right of eminent domain is subordinate to all statutory and
constitutional restrictions on the subject^ and to the further
/97 111. 506.
;,C.&E.I. R.R. Co. v. Wiltse 116 111. 449.
3. Dunham v. Hyde Park r; 5 111. 371.
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limitations of the courts which are authorized to entertain appli-
cations for its exercised They are clothed wilh ample power to
prevent any abuses of the right, and from the statement of facts
it must be clearly shown that the use for which the land is sought
is a public one.2" However, unless there is a manifest injustice,
oppression or gross abuse of the power in the action a court of
equity will not interfere wi^h the exercise of discretion vested in
thera.^
The C onst i tut i onal Limitati on. Article 2, section 13 of the
Constitution of Illinois reads, "Private property shall not be taken
or' damaged for public use without ^Just compensation ".
Property Cannot Be Taken For Private Use . The C 3nst i tut i on
does not prohibit the taking for private use but the courts of this
State have repeatedly decided that this ^annot be done f The courts
of several States have come to this same conclusion but have based
their conclusion on several different grounds, some putting it
on the ground of an implied prohibition in the eminent domain
provision of the Constitutions fj some on the ground that it would
be contrary to the provision that no person shall be deprived of
his property exce-t by the lav,' of the land, others on the ground
that it would be subsersive of the fundamental principles of free
/Dunham v. flyde Park 75 111. 371.
R.R. Co. v. Wiltse (116 111. 449)
ZSmith v. Chicago etc. R.R. Co. (105 111. 511)
^Dunham v. Hyde Park (75 111. 371)
^Nesbitt v. Trumbo(39 111. 110)
Crear v. Crosby (40 111. 175)
iTBankhead v. Brown (25 Iowa 540)
Concord Ry . v. Cenly (17 N.H. 47 )
Dalles v. Druhart (16 Or. 67)
State v. Lyle (100 M.C. 497)
^Lewis Eminent Domain
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government, or contrary to the spirit of the Constitution.
The Law Of IJl^jnjois as laid down in r;esbitt v. Trumbo et al.
follows the second rule. In this case Justice Walker said, "The
record presents the question whether the act authorizing a
private way, to be established over the land of an owner against
his objection, is constitutional. The provision is found in
the ninety third section of the Act of 1861 (Sess. Laws, 283).
The provision of our Constitution supposed to be violated by this
enactment is the eighth section of article thirteen, and is this:
'No person shall be imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold,
liberties or privileges, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner
deprived of his life, liberty , or property, but by the Judgment
of his peers or the law of the land.' Does the establishment of
such a way across a man's land disseise him of 'his freehold'
or deprive him of 'his property' as provided in this enactment,
without the judgment of his peers, or contrary to the law of the
land?—- These (cases cited) are the cases in which Lhe principle
in which the principle has been applied And Lhey seem to
fully justify the objection that the law is unconstitutional.
Jt (the way in question) was alone for individual or private use-
And to hold that Lhe legislature might exercise this power
would doubtless open the way to other and more serious encroach-
ments upon the right of property which was designed to be secured
by this most salutory provision.
f.Hepburns Case (13 Blaad 95)
'Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R. Co. (18 Wend "9)
£ Matter of Tounsend (59 N.Y.tf
/A39 111. 110.
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Chapter iii
PARTICULAR USES
Highways
One of the oldest and most common uses for which land may he
taken is that of highways. All courts agree that this is a taking
for- public use. It is sometimes necessary for public convenience
to construct roads which are mere cul de sacs. In ohe case of
Sheaff v. The Peopled a road was held to be a public highway although
it terminated against private land with no outlet. Also the road
is none the less public because it terminates at a church, cemetry
or farmhouse. Neither does the object of the traveler in using
the road, whether for amusement or for business affect the public
character of the road.
Certain Roads Declared Fublic -ighways Ey Statute. "All roads
in this State which have been laid out in pursuance of any law
of this State, or of the territory of Illinois, or which have been
established by dedication or used by the public as a highway for
fifteen years, and which have not been vacated in pursuance of
law, are hereby declared to be public highways". 111. Rev. Stat.
Ch. 121, Sec. 1.
Condemnation Of Land. Comissi oners of highways may condemn
lands under the right of eminent domain for location of a road^
may widen a road to sixLy feet*, and enter adjoining lands to
construct drains, and may acquire gravel, rock, and building
material on adjoining lands where such material is necessary for the
construction and maintenance of roads/
t^l]5ev i8|tat « Ch - 121 » Sec - 272 • *-Idem Sec. 31. .2 Idem Sec. 8.
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Public Wharves And Warehouses
Where wharves and warehouses are necessary for landing passeng-
ers and handling freight they are of such a nature as to be con-
sidered a public use, but in Illinois their location by condemnation
is not, as yet, a fixed right.7
Government Purposes
Frivate property may be condemned by the general government
for establishing forts* post offices, dock yards-jf court housesf
military camps, light houses, barracks, custom houses^ armories,
and arsenals?
Cemeteries
.
Cities, villages, and townships are given the right by statu-
tory provision to establish cemeteries, within and without the
corporate limits, end to acquire the lands therefor by condemnation
or otherwise . This right is also given to two or more cities,
villages, or townships where suci wish to unite in maintaining
a cemetery
.
Six or more persons may organize a Cemetry Association with
the right to purchase land but have no power to ac juire land by -
condemnation proceedings^ However, wren such an association has
once established a burial grounds it can condemn additional ground
whenever such may be needed.^"
/•See Chicago Dock Co. v. Garrity (115 111. 155)
2-U.S. v. Fox (94 U.S. 315)
5 Kohl v. U.S. (91 U.S. 367)
^Harris v. Elliot (10 Pet. 35)
j'.Ch. 31, Sec. 5. £.Idem Sec. 6. £ldem Sec. 38. Ode... Sec. 49.
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Ra i lway s
.
The appropriation of property to the construction or use of
a railway for the transportation of persons or p-operty is an
appropriation for public use 7
,
the public having an interest in
the railway Under the Constitution of Illinois 1848 railroads were
3
not considered common highways as they noe wre . Article 11,
Section 12 of the present Constitution reads , "Railways are hereby
declared public highways and shall be free to all persons for the
transportation of their persons and property thereon under such
obligation* as may be prescribed by law."
It is well established on decisions that property may be taken
for a right of wayf a freight or passenger depot-f' stock yards
work shops^ paint shopsf elevators, corn cribs, lumber yards, and
lime houses where such uses are necessary for the construction
and operation of the railway.'*
Branches Or Lateral Lines. In general, the right of a railroad
to condemn property for the construction of branch road or lateral
line depends upon zhe express words ar necessary implication of the
charter or statutory provisions. In the case of C. & E. I. R.R. v.
Wiltse, it was held that the grant of the power of eminent domain
to the corporation should be strictly construed. The court said,
/Perm. Mutual Life Insurance Co. (141 111. 35)
C. R. I. & P. R.R. Co. v. City of Joliet (79 111. 25)
2.C. & W. I. R.R. Co. v. Ayres (105 111. 511)
^.The Central Military Tract Co. v. Rocafellow (17 111. 541)
y.C. B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Wilson (17 111. 125)
i:Low v. G.& C. R.R. Co. (18 111. 3?5)
6.111. Central R.R. Co. v. Wathen (17 111. 582)
y,See Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 114, Section 18.
£.16 111.449.

"Therefore, the mere fact thai the building of lateral ranch roads
may add to the earnings of the main line of a railroad company
or increase its business, will noi authorize such corporations
to uild the same under its charter which fails to so provide."
Spurs. Spurs differ from lateral roads or branch lines in
that they are built to private establishments while the latter are
construcued to reach some particular part of the country. The
right to condemn private property for the use of spurs depends
somewhat upon circumstances of the case and Lhe statute under which
the right is claimed, but the tendancy in this State has been to
treat spurs as private uses.
In a c?se where a brick yard was three-fourths of a mile
distant from the railroad, a spur was refused as being for a pri-
vate purposed In Fisher v. Chicago =stc. R.R. Co?" where a rail-
road company had a side track for many years before, connecting
its main line with a public warehouse and elevator, in a town, over
the land of anotrer, but witr.out having right of way therefor
except by the mere consent or license of the jwner, iu was held
that the company had the right to institute proceedings to condemn
the land over which such branch ran for the right of way. In
another case the court said, All termini of tracks and switches
are more or less beneficial to private parties, but the public
character of the use of the tracks is never affected by this. If they
are open to the public use indescriminately nd under the public
control to the extent that railroads generally are, they are tracks
for public u~e. It may be that such tracks will be used almost
/,116 111. 449. Chi. etc. R.R. Co. v. Wiltse 2.104 111. 323.
3-Chicapro Dock etc. v. Garrity (115 111. 155)
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entirely by the manufacturing establishment, yet if there is no
exclusion of an equal right of use by others, and this singleness
os use is simply the result of location and convenience of access
it caimot affect the question." In this case it was a question
of laying track down a st -eet by permission of the city
council under the incorporation act of the City of Chicago, the
track to connect a public warehouse with the railway company.
In these cases as well as in others f \.he circums cances have been
so material to ..he decisions that it is impossible to establish
a general rule
.
Condemnation Of Property. The statutory provision in regard to
the condemnation of private property by railroad corporations
reads, "if any such corporation shall be unable to agree with the
owner for the purchase of any real estate required for the pur-
poses of its corporation, or the transaction of its business, or
for its depots, station buildings, machine shops, or for right of
way, or- any other lawful purpose connected with or necessary
to the building, operating, or running of said road, such cor-
poration may acquire such title in the manner that may now and
hereafter be provided for by Lhe law of eminent omain.
Acquisition Of Materials . Railroad corporations may by
legislative enactments," enter upon and take from any land adjacent
to its road, earth, gravel, stone or other materials
,
except fuel
and wood, necessary for construction of such road "
/-Vincent v. c. & A. R.R. Co. (49 111. 53) Also see 143 111. 450.
^.Chapter 114. Gecuion 18, Illinois Revised Statutes.
3 Idem, Chapter 114, "ection 19.

:-;ai_lr oaii Crossings. One railroad company ma.;' condemn a
/
crossing over the right of way of another railroad Co. under the
right of eminent domain, but the whole question of railroad cross
ings has^mBstly decided by statutes.
Chapter 75, Section 209 of the Illinois Revised Statutes
requires that a railroad make a crossing of anolher railroad at
;j
such a place and manner as will not unnecessarily impede or
endanger the travel or transportation upon the railway to be
crossed. In the case of objection to the place or mode of cross-
ing proposed by the company desiring the same, either party may
apply to the Board of Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners and
it shall be their du>.y to view the grounds, give each party a
chance to be heard, and decide upon the manner and place of
crossing. The damage, in ^ase the parties fail to agree, snail
be determined as is provided for by law.
Elevated Railways are held to be similar to ordinary rail-
ways and the pri vale <^es which ohey have in regard to the right
to condemn property is not materially different.
^
Street Railways. Like ordinary railways, a street railway
is of a quasi public nature and its use is of a public character.
It is a common carrier of passengers and tine right of eminent
domain may be exercised to secure a right of way .
3
I / St. L.
,
J. & C. R.R. Co. v. S. & N . W. R.R. Co. (96 111. 274)
^Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 3:, Sections 09,70,32, 3,73.
i
'5
#
Idera Chapter 134, Section 1.
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Drainage, Ditchers and. Levees.
In some of the States without express constitutional provisions
statutes have been passed giving the right to construct ditches,
levees and the like through private property. Such laws have been
upheld on the ground that when lands are so situated towards
each other as to create a mutual dependence and a natural community
the State has the right to apply a rule for their common benefit.
Such legislation has been held good against the contention that it
violated the Fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of The
United States/
Such a doctrine has not been called for in Illinois for Article
iv, Section -31 of the Constitution of Illinois reads, "The General
Assembly may pass laws permitting the owners of lands to construct
drains, ditches and levees for agricultural, sanitary or mining
purposes, across the land of others, and provide for the organization
of drainage districts, and vest the corporate authorities thereof
with power to construct and maintain levees, drains and ditches,
and to keep in repair all drains, ditches and levees heretofore
constructed under the laws of the State, by special assessments
upon the property benefitted thereby."
This provision has been supplemented by a great amount of
legislation regulating the organization of drainage districts,
assessments, surveys etc. "Whenever a majority of the owners of
land within a district proposed to be organized, who shall have
arrived at lawful age and who represent one-third in area of ihe
/•Wurts v. Hoagland (114 U.S. 606)
gill. Rev. Stat., Chapter 42, Section 1.
-
I'.,
lands to be reclaimed or benefited, desire to construct a drain--,
ditch
,
levee, or other work to be known in this act aa a 'drain-
i
age and levee district across the land of others for —agri-
cultural, sanitary or mining purposes " may file a petition
in the county court. Before the work is done the land is exam-
ined by a board of commissioners who judge upon the advisability
of constructing such work.'*
Canals
.
Canals are public highways and where a uniform toll is charged
they are considered as a public use for which property may be
condemned^ and all necessary stone, timber and other material for
construct l'on or repairs.
School Houses
In a case where a school house site is selected and the compen-
sation cannot be agreed upon by the school directors and ihe
parties interested the directors .nay proceed oO condemn the land
under the exercise of the right of eminent domain: Provided, that
no tract of land lying outside the limits of any incorporated
city or village, and lying within forty rods of the dwelling
house of the owner of the land, shall be taken for a school house
without the owner's consent.^
Water Works.
A city, village or town is given the right by statute to
acquire property by condemnation for the purpose of establishing
/•The People v. Wells (12 111. 102) 2,111. Rev. Stat. Ch. 20, Sec. 3.
itFor particulars see 111. Rev. Stat. Chapter 42.
fill. Rev, Stat., Ch. 122, Sec. 152.
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a water .vorks and the jurisdiction of "uch village, city or town
for this purpose extends five miles from the corporation.'
Right Extended to Chicago.
The Righl Of Eminent Domain has been extended to the Ci„y of
Chicago for acquiring property advantageous or desirable for
municipal purposes, such right .0 be in conformity with the laws
of the State/
Mini ci pal Parks. "The City of Chicago may acquire by purchase
or otherwise, municipal parks, play grounds, public beaches and
bathing places, an" improve, equip, maintain, and regulate the same*T
Sewerage
Cities have the power to construct drainage systems and to
acquire the necessary property, y
Chicago Drainage District is given the right to condemn prop-
erty for construction of drainage systems contemplated in the act
relating to that drainage district.
Development of '.lines.
The Constitution of Illinois 3gives the legislature the right
to pass laws permitting owner- of lands to construct drains and
ditches for mining purposes. The laws which have been passed in
regard to development of mines have exceeded the power extended in
the constitution.
/•Chapter 24, Section 170. Illinois Revised Statutes.
^.Chapter 84, Sections 193as , 270a. Idem
^.Chapter 24, Section 336a. Idem
^.Chapter 24, Section 193. Idem
^Article iv.
,
Section 31.
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In 1874 an act was assel reading, "Be it enacted That
whenever any mine or mining; place shall be so situated that it
cannot be conveniently worked without a road or railroad thereto,
or ditch to drain the same or to convey Lhe water thereto, nd
such road, railroad or ditch s all necessarily pass over, through
or under land occupied or owned by others , the owner or operator
of any such mine or mining place may enter upon such land, and
construct such "oad, railroad or ditch, upon complying with the
law in relation to the exercise of the right of eminent domain."
This same act also authorised commissioners of highways to lay out
public highways, or private roads or cart ways from any coal mine
to a public highway or railroad whenever the public good re-
quires .
In 1877 the Supreme Court in the case of Scholl v. German Coal
Co^ decided that .he use of a strip of land by a coal company,
upon which to construct a tramway leading from the coal works
to a railroad track is a private use, and that land cannot be
condemned for this purpose. Here the court departed from the rule
established in some other States where the taking of property for
railroad switches to mines has been sustained on the ground
that the development of mines is for the public benefit. In this
case the court said, " The coal, works, and he present tramway
are, in the strictest sense, private property, and the public,
generally have no more interest in them or in the operation of
/. 118 111. 427.
2.See rays v. Risher (32 Penn. St. 169)
3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 186
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the works, including the tramway, than they have in any other
strictly private business."
According to the ^round taken in this case it is probable
that the other provisions of this act will meet with the same fate
when ^heir constitutionality is questioned.
Public Ferries
"When it shall be necessary, for the establishment or use of
any ferry, to take private property, for a landing, ferry house,
or approach to any ferry, proceedings may be had under any act
that may be in force for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, subject to all restrictions that may be prescribed by law."
Sites For County Buildings.
Sites for county buildings such as court houses may be appro-
priated under the right of eminent domain.**
Mill Dam Privileges.
An interesting class of legislation is that which has been
passed in respect to mill dam privileges. In a case where the
dam is erected across a stream, the back water caused by this
artificial arrangement generally destroys the use of some of the
land above. This is clearly a case of taking private property,
and since the owner of the land does not have any interest in the
purpose for which the dam has been erected he does not share in
/.111. Rev. Stat., Ch. 25, Sec. 23.
f.Idem, Ch. 54, Sec. 108.

.J3
the benefit as in a case of compulsory drainage. Statutes in
regard to this class of legislation have been enforced in Illinois
and several other States from an early period. These acts- known
as "Mill Acts" - were passed at a time when public mills were high-
ly necessary, and land was of very little value. Corn meal was then
about the only breadstuff and it was of such value that the over-
flowing of a few acres of land in constructing a mill dam was a
detriment too small 10 consider.
Those statutes of Illinois are found in Laws 1819, p. 264;
Rev. Code of 1827, p. 297; and Rev. Laws 1833, p. 449. These were
limited to watermills, grist mills and saw mills, except that of
1819 which was confined to grist mills.
For a long time these acts stood unquestioned. In some of the
other States such acts were held good?' The Supreme court of M ass-
achussetts said, Whether if this is trenching too closely upon
the great principle which gives security to private rights, it seems
now too late to inquire, such legislation having been in full
operation in this State a century and a half."
Under an act of Illinois in 1872 relating to mills and millers
this privelege was extended to other than grist mills and taking
of private property was authorized for erection and operation
of mills generally, leaving the question of public use to the
courts. This right was disputed in the case of Gaylord v. Sani-
tary District. There the court said, "if this act were limited in
/,See list of cases in read v. Amoskeag Mnf. Co. (113 U. S. 9)
^.Murdock v. Stickney (8 Cush. 113)
£111. Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 701.
^204 111. 576.
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its scope to manufactories which are of a public necessity, as
grist mills in a new country not yet penetrated by railroads,
the question would be somewhat different from what it is now. But
even in such a case it would be essential that the statutes should
require to be public in fact, in other words, that it should
contain provisions entitling the public to accomodations." In that
case the court held the statutes unconstitutional in so far as it
applied to condemnation for other purposes other than grist mills.
Other Cases Of Flooding Land
In some of the other States the flooding of land has been per-
mitted for such purposes as cranberry culture, fish culture, and
the like, but such questions have never been legislated upon in
Illinois. If such questions should arise there is no doubt but
that, the courts would follow the restricted policy established in
the mill dam cases.
Parks
.
The Illinois legislation in regard to parks is quite extensive.
The acts in regard to appropriating private property for uses connec-
ted with parks will now be reviewed.
Altering Location Or Boundary Of Public Grounds. Whenever the
corporative authori lives of towns having control or supervision
of any public parks, boulevards, driveways or highways, which have
been located in pursuance of a vote of the people of such towns,
desire to alter or change the location of the same or any of the
boundary lines of the same, they may, by petition in writing,
apply to the circuit courts of the county for leave to make such
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change. Notice of this application must be made in some county
neaspaper at least ten days before the application is made. All
parties objecting may appear before the courts. If the court
thinks the change is for the public good, it grants the corporative
|
authorities the right to make the change and to acquire the addit-
|
ional land by purchase or condemnation proceedings as in other
cases of the exercise of the right of eminent domain. 5
•
Driveways To Parks.
If the park commissioners wish to open a driveway to a park
they make an application ,o the board of trustees of the townin
which it is proposed to make the same, if there be a board of
trustees, and to supervisor and assessor, in case there is no
board (the said board of trustees, and supervisor and assessor,
being hereby declared corporative authorities for the purpose
of this section) for leave to establish such driveway. If the
commissioners wish to use any public street or road as driveway they
may take such provided the consent of the owners of a majority of
the lineal front feet of the property be first obtained in writing,
and also the consent of the city council, trustees or commissioners
according to whether the street or road is in a city, village, or
within a township. '
Drainage
The commissioners may also acquire the right to construct necess-
/Mass. Rev. Laws Ch. 196, Sec. 39.
^-Turner v. Nye (154 Mass. 579)
5,Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 105, Section 4.
Idem, Sec. 7,8,9.
'/.Idem, Ch. 105, Sec. 26.
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ary sewers for drainage, but such sewers must be constructed under
such regulations as the board of public works or the proper author-
atives of the city or town may prescribe.
Driveways To Connect Different Parks
Sometimes two or more parks are so situated that it is
desirable to connect them by boulevards. Section 38 of chapter
105 gives the commissioners the right to construct such a drive-
way and to acquire such property as may be needed for the con-
struction.
Driveways to Public Parks
The board of park commissioners have the power to connect any
public park, boulevard or driveway under its control with any
park of an incorporated city, town or village, by selecting and
taking any connecting street or streets or part thereof leading
to such parks; and shall also have power to add to such parks,
any street or part thereof which adjoins and runs parallel with
with the boundary line of the park, Provided, that the street
so taken is within the district taxable for the maintenance of
such park: And provided further, thaihconsent of corporate
authorities having control of any such street so selected, and
written consent of owners of majority of frontage on streets
is obtained. And provided further that the park commissioners
may abandon and surrender any such street so taken back to the
//111. Rev. Stat. Ch. 105 Sec. 26, 32,33.
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corporate authorities by getting permission of property owners and
the corporate authori t ies . 1
Commissioners May Widen Streets
Where streets have been selected and taken under control by park
commissioners they may be widened to a uniform width of one
hundred feet, provided that some portion of each mile of the
street so selected shall be one hundred feet wide at the time
of such taking, and the needed property may be acquired by con-
demnation. ^
Extent ion Of Boulevard Or Driveway.
I
The park commissioners may extend a boulevard or driveway
along public waters by obtaining consent of the owners of two-thirds
frontage of all lands abutting on such public waters and the consent
of the corporate authorities of town or towns. In such cases the
riparian rights may be -go£t-e-n-' by condemnation proceedings
Enlargement Of Lincoln Park.''
"Be it enacted That in all cases where lands within
specific boundaries have been declared to be a public park, for
the enlargement of a public park, and provisions made for requiring
the title to the land embraced within said boundary by purchase or
otherwise, it shall be lawful to enlarge the boundaries thereof
/•111. Rev. Stat. Ch. 105, Sec. 49.
2-Id. Sec. 70,71.
.7 Id. Sec. 85.
*fld. Sec. 99.
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and to acquire lands and riparian rights by purchase or condem-
nation embraced in said limits —
"it shall be lawful for any board of commissioners of any
such park to establish, construct "nd maintain a breakwater,
as against waste from any lake or any public water, wnich in
their -judgment may be necessary to protect the land. " ^'
Creation Of Pleasure Driveways In Park Districts.
Section 107 of chapter 105 enables an area of contiguous
territory containing within its boundaries two or more incor-
porated cities, towns or villages to be incorporated as a pleasure
driveway and park district with the power iO take land for
constructing pleasure driveways, boulevards and parks. ^
Condemnation Of Riparian Rights.
When parks border on public waters and it is desirable to
reclaim submerged land such riparian rights as are necessary may be
condemned and taken. T
Park Districts may Annex property.
Park districts may annex property to parks already estab-
lished but the petition to annex requires one hundred voters
resident within the territory, and the question must finally be
submitted to the people at a special election held for that
pup os e. ^
Small Parks For Pleasure Grounds
Small parks for pleasure grounds may be located on any lots
/•111. Rev. Stat. Ch. 105, Sec. 99.
*-Id. Sec. 100.
; f. Id. Sec. 128,176, 177.
/Tld. Sec. 199.
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or parcel of land which lies within the district and such land
may be condemned for this purpose./
Connecting Parks Bordering On Public Waters.
Connecting parks which border on public waters is permitted
and such rights may be taken as are necessary for constructing
bridges, tunnels or viaducts over or under the public waters or
rivers . 2.
State Parks.
The question of the power of the State to take the right to
historical sites of battlefields under the right of eminent
domain has never been questioned in the courts of this State. If
such a question should come up our courts would no doubt concur
with the rule laid down in other States and hold this to be an
exercise for public use.
Fort Massac Park. The first act in regard to state parks
was passed in 1903 / By this act a board of trustees, styled "Port
Massac Trustees" were created with the power to receive a. convey-
ance from Hon. Reed Green, or other owners thereof, of the property,
not more than forty acres in extent, which contained the site of
Old Port Massac, at a price not to exceed three thou -and five
hundred dollars. This board has acquired this property and have
now made many improvements upon it. Some other of the historical
sites in our State will probably be treated in this manner in the
future
.
/111. Rev. Stat. Ch . 105, Sec. 199.
Aid. Ch. 105, Sec. 235,236.
/Id. Ch. 105a
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Special Assessments.
The queer position taken by our early State courts in regard
to special assessments deserves mention. Although other States have
had some vase illation- as to the source of the right of special
taxation^ Illinois seems to be the one State where Lhe right has
been directly held to be an exercise of the right of eminent domain
rather than a form of taxation. In the case of eminent domain a
question of benefit does not arise. Neither is there a question of
apportioning as there is in special assessments. This fact would
have kept the two powers seperated if there had not been another
reason. The Illinois Constitution of 1848, section 2, article 9,
declared that Lhe General Assembly should provide for levying a tax
by valuation, so that every person and corporation should pay a
tax in proportion to his or her property. According to this
provision a special assessment apportioning taxes among those who
received the benefit would have been found unconstitutional if
there had not been some ground upon which to base its validity.
Because of this fact the courts decided that a special assessment
was not a tax at all but an exercise of the right of eminent domain?
In those early cases this explanation was simply used to justify
a needed thing. When the present constitution was adopted in 1870
this clause was left out. Since then the courts have righted them-
selves and now ho3d*special assessments to be a form of taxation.
/.New Orleans v. Drainage Co. (11 La. An. 338)
Striker v. Kelley (7 Hill 9)
^.Chicago v. Colby (20 111. 614)
^.Howard v. St. Clair Drainage Co. (51 111. 130)
Peoria v. Kidder (66 111. 351)
Wright v. Chicago (46 111. 44)
#White v. People (94 111. 604)
Chicago R.R. Co. v. Elmhurst (165 111. 148)
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Chapter iv.
THE TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY.
What amounts to a taking. "The entry upon land with the inten-
tion of permanently holding it, whether the interest claimed in it
is a fee title or only an easement, 3rt is of course a taking of
property v/ithin the meaning of the constitutional provision require-
ing compensation for taking." 27
In regard to the nature and degree of injury a piece of
property must suffer before the case can be considered a "taking"
there 4xs a great difference of opinion. In Illinois the Consti-
tution reads"taken or damaged." These words have been liberally
construed in order that an owner can secure compensation in cases
where he has been substantially deprived of the use of his property.
In Rigney v. Chicago,' after mentioning the fact that some courts
have decided against consequential damages, the court says: "But
other courts of equal respectability, and as it is believed, with
better reason, hold that the change of the grade of a public high-
way, or the erection of a public improvement of any kind, .hat
causes any direct physical injury to the property of a private person
by overflowing his land and the like, by reason of which he is
substantially deprived of its ordinary use and enjoyment, is,
within the meaning of the constitution, a taking of his property
oo Lhe extent of the damage thereby occassi oned. " 3
/J.02 111. 64.
2-Am. & Eng. Ency . of Law, Vol. 10, p. 1102.
3.Nevins v. Peoria (41 111., 502)
Gillham v. Madison (49 111. 484)Shawneetown y. Mason .(82,111. 537)Stack v. East St. Louis 85 til. 377
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To allow compensation for injury damage must be special and
not general as in a case where a "./hole neighborhood is damaged in
common. Injuries to the remainder of tract of which part has been
taken, damage to trade and business, danger from fire, danger of
3"
killing live stock, injury from noise and confusion,6 injury from
obstruction of light, injury from change of grade in a street,
and several other such detriments have been taken into account in
assessing the damages sustained. The Illinois rule is a very
liberal one
.
The Property That May Be Taken. Generally speaking "he right
of eminent domain extends to all forms of property and to all
interests in property. In the case of Met. City R.R. Co. v. Chi.,
the court, in speaking of this right, said, "Property in its
broadest and most comprehensive sense, includes all rights and
interests in real and personal property, and also in easements,
franchisements
, and incorporeal hereditaments. That which nay be
taken for public uses is not exclusively tangible property. The
right of eminent domain in an attribute of sovereignty, and whatever
CQuincy v. Jones (76 111. 231)
y. Stock v. East St. Louis (85 111. 37?)
a.Chi. etc. R.R. Co. v. Nix (137 111. 141)
iTWilson v. Rockford etc R.R. Co. (59 111. 273)
Y.Chicago etc. R.R. Co. v. Aldrich (134 111. 9)
Jones v. Chi. R.R. Co. (38 111. 380)
Central ia etc. R.R. Co. v. Brake (125 111.393)
SRohman v. Chicago (140 111. 226)
De Buol v. Freeport etc. R.R. Co. (Ill 111. 449)
^Keitsburg etc. R.R. Co. v. Henry (79 111. 390)
/.Pekin v. Winkel (77 111. 57)
Stone v. Fairbury etc. R.R. Co. (68 111. 396)
Pekin v. Brereton (67 111. 4':9)
£87 111. 317.
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tangible or intangible; may be subjected to the exercise of its
power, and may be seized and appropriated to public uses when
necessity demands it."
Private Contracts being property, are consequently subject
to condemnation. The effect on contracts is generally indirect
arising from the condemnation of property to which the contract
is relative.
Materials For Construction may be taken as in a case
where it is necessary for a railroad company to condemn additional
land in order to obtain enough dirt for a deep fill. 7
Timber may be removed by railroad companies even if not
on the right of way if such timber endangers the use of the right
of way.^
Property Of Private Corporations is also subject to the
right of eminent domain the same as property of private individuals'^
Property Already Devoted ro Public Use. "To warrant the
taking of property of one party, already appropriated to a public
use, and placing it wholly or in part in the hands of another
party for a public use, it is essential that the new use be a
different use, and also that the change shall be for the benefit
of the public. Whether the new use be a different use from the
present one is a judicial question which the courts must decide.
But where the new use, in its nature, may be a public benefit,
/.Hinde and Lesher v. Wabash M. Co. (15 111. 72)
/^.Also see under RAILROADS.
/111. Rev. Stat. Ch. 32, Sec. 70.
^The Peoria, Pekin & Jachsonville R.R. Co. v. The Peoria & S. R.R.Co.
(66 111. 174)
3.0. R. I. & P. R.R. Co. v. Town of Lake (71 111. 333)
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whether the change will be for the benefit of the public is a
political question, to be determined by a political department
of the government, and generally, if not always, by uhe lawmaking
power
.
Villi le land held for a public purpose can be condemned for
another public purpose when the latter is different from the
former and consistent with the rights of the public under the
first, such a change cannot be made as the taking of a public
square for a school house site. Such would be inconsistent
with the original use?
State Property. The Federal courts hald .hat State prop-
erty is subject to the Federal power of eminent domainf
Statutory Exemption. In several States dwelling houses
and other property similar have been exempted from the exercise
of the right of condemnati on? but in Illinois there has never
been any such legislation passed.
/.L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co. v. C. & W. I. R.R. Co. (97 111. 512)
XDavies v. Nichols (32 111. App. 610)
^.Stockton v. Baltimore (32 Fed. Rep. 17)
V.Curtis v. Smith (35 Conn. 156)
Cummins v. Shields (34 Ind. 50)
Willoughby v. Shipman (28 Mo. 50)
State v. Block (23 V.rend. 360)
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